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The status of family, with all of its attendant benefits and burdens, is
currently available only to persons related through blood or marriage.'
Providing opportunities to obtain family status to persons who live
outside of traditional families is both equitable and worthwhile in ad-
vancing the goals traditionalists promote.2 For gay men and lesbian wo-
men, 3 the problem of family status is exacerbated by public policy, and
by statutes denying them marriage and criminalizing their sexual
behavior.4
This Note begins by assessing the scope of discrimination suffered
by gay and lesbian families. In Part II, the Note explores the avenues
currently open to gay and lesbian couples to obtain family status. These
include constitutional challenges to marriage statutes, and the use of con-
tracts, adult adoption, as well as wills, living wills, and durable powers of
attorney to obtain some semblance of family rights and responsibilities.
Finally, in Part III, the Note evaluates domestic partnership ordi-
J.D. 1992, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The author
wishes to thank Professor Margaret Stewart for her invaluable criticism. The author also wishes to
thank Susan J. Sporer for her support and patience throughout this project.
1. E. CARRINGTON BOGAN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK 80 (1983) [hereinafter ACLU HANDBOOK]. No state has ever
knowingly allowed two persons of the same sex to marry. See Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day
Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1783 n.2
(1988).
2. ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 80-107. The idea of granting family status to gay and
lesbian couples encompasses not only rights but responsibilities. As in marriage, the partners assume
financial responsibility for each other, and for dependents. Child support and perhaps alimony
would be granted at the dissolution of the relationship.
3. The terms "gay men" and "lesbian women" are used throughout the paper instead of the
term "homosexual" for a number of reasons. Primarily, the use of the terms "gay men" and "lesbian
women" connote a view of homosexuality as being a neutral difference or a social construct rather
than an illness or manifestation of immorality. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 1-2 nn.5-
6 (Editors of the Harvard Law Review 1989).
4. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. See also Robb London, Gay Groups Turn to
State Courts to Win Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at B6. The article charts out which states
have sodomy laws that apply to all people, which have sodomy laws that apply only to same-sex
couples, and which have repealed such laws. The article details a new trend for state courts to hold
these laws unconstitutional under state constitutions. However, nearly half the states retain such
laws, and they are often used to evidence public policy against gay and lesbian relationships in other
contexts, such as child custody, housing disputes, and employment discrimination.
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nances, a recent development open to nontraditional families. Domestic
partnership ordinances allow couples to register their relationships with
a city or state, and thereby enjoy some of the benefits of marriage. 5
Throughout the Note, the case of In Re Guardianship of Sharon Kowal-
ski 6 will be used to illustrate the concepts presented.
I. THE IMPACT OF DENYING FAMILY BENEFITS TO
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES
Family is a status given special accord in our society. Legal rights
and responsibilities attach between family members. 7 For example,
rights of inheritance are spelled out in the law, and in the absence of a
will, family members receive priority in inheritance. 8 Certain family
members are obliged to provide financial support for other family mem-
bers, as in the case of parents and children. 9
Marriage is the vehicle by which otherwise unrelated adults create
the family relationship. The Supreme Court has called marriage a funda-
mental liberty, "one of the basic civil rights of man." 10 Typically, courts
support the institution of marriage because it is "the foundation of the
family and of society."'" In the context of gay and lesbian unions,
though, courts quickly sidestep the fundamental rights issue and instead
rely on a view of marriage that is centered around procreation.' 2
"[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of
societal values associated with the propagation of the human race."' 3
This argument concludes that because marriage of a same-sex couple in-
5. See infra notes 160-208 and accompanying text.
6. There are actually three decisions surrounding this guardianship dispute: In re Guardian-
ship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1467 (1986) [hereinafter
Kowalski 1]; In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 392 N.W.2d 310, (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 1986
[hereinafter Kowalski I]; In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
rev. denied, 1992 [hereinafter Kowalski 11]. See also KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE ANDRZEJEWSKI,
WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? (1988) [hereinafter THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEW-
SKI]. In that book, Thompson gives her viewpoint on the case, and describes her life with Kowalski.
7. See American Civil Liberties Union Public Education Department, Legislative Briefing Se-
ries Domestic Partnership 2 (1991) [hereinafter A CL U Briefing Series].
8. See id. at 2-4.
9. See ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 80-81.
10. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
11. Id. at 384.
12. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
13. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195. The Singer court also states that "society as a whole views mar-
riage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children." Id. Con-
trast this view of "society" with the fact that more than 15.5 million children do not live with two
biological parents, and the fact that as many as 8 to 10 million children are born into families with a
gay or lesbian parent. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
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volves no possibility of children born of the union,14 a state is free to
restrict marriage to male-female couples.' 5
What these courts fail to recognize is that marriage has never been
restricted to couples capable of reproducing.' 6 Furthermore, gays and
lesbians are not any less fertile than the heterosexual population, and in
fact are increasingly joining the ranks of parenthood. 7 Many have chil-
dren from previous unions and some become parents within the context
of their gay or lesbian relationships.' 8 Finally, and most importantly,
society favors the marital/family relationship for reasons other than pro-
creation, and these reasons still exist in gay and lesbian relationships.' 9
Generally, the family, with its economic interdependence, is seen as
"the foundation of a strong society". 20 Other groups of unrelated adults
also form economically interdependent units that would both benefit and
benefit from traditional family status. In fact, only 15% of Americans
live in a traditional nuclear family, with a father providing financial sup-
port, and a mother tending to the home and child care.2' With only 15%
of the population living in the basic, stable family unit as viewed by tradi-
tionalists, society could benefit from expanding the status of family to
include others. Recognizing other configurations of adults who choose
to be economically interdependent, and encouraging such reliances,
could further the societal stability traditionalists seek to promote.22
In addition to economic stability, families can provide emotional
14. Carried to its "logical" conclusion, this means that states can prohibit marriage between
people unable to have children due to either age or physical condition.
15. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195. See also Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
16. ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 81. Typically the only requirements for a marriage
license are that the applicants must be of a certain minimum age, not closely related by blood, and
free of certain forms of venereal disease. Taking the idea that marital privacy rights hinge on procre-
ation to its limits means that states could prevent post-menopausal women or other infertile people
from marrying.
17. See generally, DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LESBIAN WOMAN, ch. 5, (Revised ed.
1983).
18. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2
(1990).
19. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
20. Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights? On Two Coasts, the Growing Debate
Produces Two Different Answers, TIME MAG., Nov. 20, 1989, at 101.
21. According to some studies, only 15% of the U.S. population lives in home consisting of "a
working husband, homemaker wife, and children." See Laurie Becklund, The Word 'Family' Gains
New Meaning, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, Part A, at 3.
22. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Columnist Anna Quindlen argues in favor of
allowing same-sex marriage using a traditional values argument: "Love and commitment are rare
enough; it seems absurd to thwart them in any guise." Quindlen argues that there is no secular
reason to take a "patchwork approach of corporate, governmental and legal steps to guarantee what
can be done simply, economically, conclusively and inclusively with the words 'I do.'." Recognizing
the Commitment of Same-sex Couples, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1992, § 1, at 17.
1992)
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stability. Allowing competent adults who wish to form a family to do so
increases personal choice, and allows people who are already living in
these stable family units to enjoy the privileges and protections tradi-
tional families currently enjoy. 23
There is no reason to exclude persons who are not involved in a
sexual relationship from forming family units. The key benefits provided
to society by families are the economic and emotional benefits, and these
benefits can be provided by any group of people who agree to live as a
family for an indefinite period of time. However, many of the objections
to allowing an expansion of the definition (and protections) of family sta-
tus surround the gay and lesbian issue.24 These objections are largely
based on false stereotypes of gays and lesbians, and on ideas about moral-
ity and sexuality. 25
The reluctance of courts and legislators to recognize an expanded
definition of family has translated into an unwillingness to extend family
rights and benefits to nontraditional families. These rights and benefits
include employment benefits such as insurance and pensions, equal ac-
cess to housing, status as next-of-kin in medical emergencies, guardian-
ship preference for a disabled family member, preference in child custody
and adoption, rights of inheritance, the power to make funeral arrange-
ments for a family member, and the right to sue in tort for loss of consor-
tium and mental duress upon injury of a family member. 26
For example, a lesbian recently sued her deceased lover's employer
for discrimination for refusing to pay her "death benefits" the company
normally pays out to surviving spouses, children, and "other relatives
who are dependant on the employee participant prior to his or her death
who demonstrate financial need after death."' 27 For the most part, em-
ployee benefits such as insurance, pensions, funeral leave, and death ben-
23. See ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 80-81.
24. See, e.g., ROGER J, MAGNUSON, ARE "GAY RIGHTS" RIGHT? vii (1985).
25. See, e.g., id. at v - viii. There, the author states, using circular logic, that most gays, because
they keep their sexuality private, do not suffer from discrimination. After citing the "health dan-
gers" of the homosexual lifestyle, the author states that if gays are given civil rights, "many other-
wise normal [sic] people beset by occasional thoughts, temptations, or inclinations, may be drawn
into an overtly homosexual life-style that will victimize them physically, emotionally, and spiritu-
ally." He further states that homosexuals "frequently victimize" children, and engage in promiscu-
ous and "peculiar" sexual practices. Id. On the contrary, the vast majority of child molestations are
committed by heterosexual men, who comprise less than 50% of the population. See ELLEN BASS &
LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL 20 (1988).
26. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
27. See Michael Schachner, Lesbian Partner Sues AT&T For Benefits, CRAIN'S BUS. INS., Sept.
17, 1990, at 6. See also Tamar Lewin, Suit Over Death Benefits Asks, What Is A Family?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at B7.
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efits are not readily available to gay and lesbian partners of employees. 28
Although a few government employers now extend employment benefits
to nontraditional families,29 even fewer private employers have followed
suit.30
Housing benefits are another problem area for gay and lesbian
couples. Some zoning ordinances restrict the relationships of persons liv-
ing in single-family homes in a particular area.31 Courts have ruled such
ordinances are valid3 2 and lesbian and gay couples can be excluded on
this basis. Other problems exist in the rental context, where landlords
can refuse to rent to unmarried couples, whether heterosexual, gay, or
lesbian. 33 In New York, where rent controlled apartments can be re-
tained only by family members when the named tenant dies, gays and
lesbians have only recently won the right to be considered "family" for
the purposes of the rent control laws.34 Even in this context, though, the
status of family is not presumed but must be demonstrated using several
court-defined criteria. 35
Inheritance laws also favor traditional family members, even distant
relatives, over a gay or lesbian partner if a gay man or lesbian woman
dies intestate.36 Marriage laws, of course, give the married partners cer-
tain rights of inheritance in the absence of a will.3 7 Even when a gay man
or lesbian woman has a will naming a partner, the will is more likely to
28. See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
29. Id.
30. The American Psychological Association, American Friends Service Committee, National
Organization for Women, ACLU National Office, ACLU of Northern California, Seattle Mental
Health Institute, Worker's Trust, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Albert Einstein
College of Medicine/Montefiore Medical Center are private organizations which offer benefits to
domestic partners voluntarily. See ACLU Briefing Series, supra note 7, at 6.
31. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), where the Supreme Court upheld an
ordinance prohibiting unrelated people from living together in certain types of housing. But see
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), where the Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance which limited occupancy of a dwelling to immediate family in such a way that it was
illegal for a grandmother to live with her son, his child, and the child's cousin. The distinction the
Court drew was that the Belle Terre ordinance promoted family values, while the East Cleveland law
was "slicing deeply into the family itself". Id. at 498.
32. See, e.g., Boraas, 416 U.S. 1.
33. See State of Minnesota v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), where the Supreme Court of
Minnesota ruled that the Minnesota Human Rights Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination
based on marital status, could not be inteipreted to compel a landlord to rent to an unmarried couple
as long as the state's fornication laws were in effect.
34. See Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789, (1989); East 10th Street Associates
v. Estate of Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
35. See cases cited supra note 34. The cases define family as "two adult lifetime partners whose
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interde-
pendence." Braschi, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 211; Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
36. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 225 (1981).
37. Id.
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be challenged and overturned than a will favoring traditional family
members. 38 The same holds true for life insurance claims where a lesbian
woman or gay man has named a partner as beneficiary.
II. ONE LESBIAN FAMILY'S PREDICAMENT
In November 1983, a drunk driver struck Sharon Kowalski's car. 39
As a result of the accident, Kowalski, then 27, suffered severe brain dam-
age and other physical injuries, leaving her confined to a wheel chair4° .
Kowalski was unable to act on her own behalf, creating the need for the
appointment of a guardian. Kowalski had been living in a closeted4' les-
bian relationship with Karen Thompson for four years before the acci-
dent. 42 The two had exchanged rings, and each had named the other as
beneficiary on their life insurance policies.4 3 Neither woman had re-
vealed the nature of their relationship to their families. 44
Immediately after the accident, Thompson had difficulty visiting
Kowalski in the hospital, or even getting information on her condition.45
Later, Thompson struggled to gain access to Kowalski to participate in
her treatment, as Kowalski was repeatedly transferred from one facility
to the next by her family. At each new juncture, Thompson met with
opposition from the staff of the various facilities where Kowalski was
placed and from Kowalski's parents.46
Eventually, a legal battle ensued between Thompson and Kowalski's
father, Donald over the guardianship of Sharon Kowalski. 47 Mr. Kowal-
ski disputed Thompson's assertion that she and Sharon Kowalski were
38. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
39. See THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 6, at 1-8, (1988). See also Gina M. Torielli,
Note, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of Medical Crises, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220
(1989).
40. See Kowalski I, supra note 6, at 862-63; Kowalski II, supra note 6, at 312; Kowalski III,
supra note 6, at 791.
41. "Closeted" refers to gay and lesbian couples who choose not to make the nature of their
relationship generally known. See THE ALYSON ALMANAC 90 (1989), which defines "closet" as
"[t]he place where gay men or lesbians hide, figuratively speaking, if they do not want their homo-
sexuality to be known." Id. There are different levels of being closeted: sometimes the information
is kept from everyone, sometimes a few gay and lesbian friends know about the relationship. The
latter was the case with Thompson and Kowalski.
42. See Kowalski I, supra note 6, at 863; Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 791. Also, see THOMP-
SON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 6, at 10-16.
43. See Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 791.
44. See THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 6, at 14.
45. Id. at 4. Thompson was told the hospital could only give out information to immediate
family members. She succeeded in getting information by telling a sympathetic priest that she was a
close family friend, sent ahead by the family to determine Sharon's condition.
46. See id. at 47-49, 66-68, and 85-88.
47. See Kowalski I, supra note 6; Kowalski II, supra note 6; Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 791-
452 [Vol. 68:447
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involved in a lesbian relationship, and the Minnesota trial court ruled
that the relationship was "uncertain". 48 The court named Mr. Kowalski
guardian and gave him complete rights to determine his daughter's visi-
tors. Mr. Kowalski promptly cut off Thompson's visitation,49 even
though Sharon Kowalski expressed a consistent and reliable desire to
continue the visits.50 Thompson battled Donald Kowalski in court for
more than three years before visitation was reinstated. 51 In the
meantime, Mr. Kowalski had removed Sharon from a rehabilitation
center, and placed her in a nursing home where her physical and mental
capabilities regressed. 52
Eventually, Donald Kowalski asked the court to remove him as
guardian, due to his own medical problems.53 Thompson again peti-
tioned the court to name her as guardian. Instead, the court named as
guardian Karen Tomberlin, a friend of Kowalski's parents who had not
even filed a petition for guardianship. The court made the appointment
without having a mandatory hearing to determine Tomberlin's fitness as
a guardian.54
On appeal, the court reversed and granted Thompson's petition for
guardianship of Sharon Kowalski. 55 In this unusually sharp opinion, the
appellate court found that the court below abused its discretion when it
denied Thompson's petition.56 The appellate court opinion was the first
to reveal that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the appointment of
Thompson. Sixteen of Kowalski's health care providers testified that
Thompson had outstanding interaction with Kowalski, had extreme in-
terest and committment in promoting Kowalski's welfare, had an excep-
tional understanding of Kowalski's physical and mental needs, and was
48. See Kowalski I, supra note 6, at 863.
49. Id. at 864; Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 791.
50. See THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 6, at 152-53, 162, and 166. When inter-
viewed by uninterested third parties using the limited means of communication to which Kowalski
was accustomed, Sharon repeatedly said she felt her wishes were not being made known to the court,
and that she wanted to be placed with Thompson. She further indicated that her relationship with
Thompson was a gay relationship and that she understood gay to mean "Love same sex." Thomp-
son reported that Kowalski regularly asked her to take her home to their house.
51. See Torielli, supra note 39, at 222.
52. Id. at 221-22.
53. See Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 791.
54. Id. at 791-92.
55. Id. at 797.
56. Id. at 796-97. "While the trial court has wide discretion in guardianship matters, this dis-
cretion is not boundless. The Minnesota guardianship statutes are specific in their requirement that
factual findings be made on a guardian's qualifications. The statutes also consistently require the
input of the ward where possible. Upon review of the record, it appears the trial court clearly abused
its discretion in denying Thompson's petition and naming Tomberlin guardian instead." Id.
1992]
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fully equipped to attend to Kowalski's social and emotional needs.57
The appellate court detailed Thompson's frequent visits to Kowal-
ski, and her unique ability to motivate Kowalski in physical therapy and
personal hygiene, which Kowalski sometimes found painful. Thompson
had built a fully handicap-accessible home in hopes of bringing Kowalski
home to live with her.58 Tomberlin had testified that she was neither
willing nor able to care for Kowalski in that manner and had hoped to
supervise Kowalski's stay in institutions. 59 Most compelling to the ap-
pellate court was that Kowalski had consistently expressed her desire to
live with Thompson and have Thompson as her guardian. The appellate
court was the first willing to believe this evidence from the health care
providers. 6°
Another important distinction the appellate court drew was that
Thompson had not invaded Kowalski's privacy by revealing the nature
of their relationship, and had not harmed Kowalski by bringing her to
events in the women's community and the gay community, where they
were both identified as lesbians. 61 The appellate court ruled that this was
all irrelevant because Kowalski herself had revealed the nature of the
relationship to health care providers and others as soon as she was able
to communicate. Further, it was in Kowalski's best interests for Thomp-
son to reveal the nature of the relationship to the health care providers so
that the doctors could be fully aware of who the patient was before she
became disabled. 62
The dispute over Sharon Kowalski's guardianship lasted seven
57. See Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 793-94. The appellate court also pointed out that Karen
Thompson was the only person willing or able to care for Sharon Kowalski outside of an institution.
Id. at 794.
58. Id. at 794.
59. Id. In fact, the appellate court noted that Tomberlin rarely visited Kowalski. Tomberlin
stated that her primary goal was to relocate Kowalski away from Thompson and nearer to Kowal-
ski's parents. Apparently this goal was set without regard to Kowalski's actual needs, because such
a move would have cut her off from available physical therapy, and placed her in a nursing home.
This was, in fact, what Kowalski's father had done with her when he initially gained custody.
60. Id. at 793. The appellate court revealed for the first time evidence in the record from
physicians' reports that Sharon Kowalski consistently indicated a desire to return home, and that
Sharon defined home as the house she shared with Karen Thompson. The appellate court pointed
out that even though no contradictory evidence was presented, the trial court concluded that Sharon
had not reliably expressed a preference for guardianship. The appellate court called this conclusion
"clearly erroneous."
61. Kowaski III, supra note 6, at 795-96. The trial court had concluded that these visits to
events in the gay community were harmful to Kowalski even though the court itself had authorized
these excursions. The only evidence the trial court had about the allegedly negative effect of these
excursions was speculation from Kowalski's sister that Sharon would not enjoy such events.
62. Id. Physicians had testified that it was not only appropriate but necessary for Thompson to
reveal to them that Kowalski was a lesbian, because "it is crucial for doctors to understand who their
patient was prior to the accident, including that patient's sexuality."
[Vol. 68:447
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years. 63 The case demonstrates the magnitude of the problems suffered
by nontraditional couples when the legal system fails to meet their needs.
In the age of AIDS, when many gay couples face medical and legal bat-
tles, Karen Thompson and Sharon Kowalski represent the lack of legal
protection afforded nontraditional families in medical emergencies and in
long-term guardianship situations.
Because marriage is not available to lesbian and gay couples,6 many
of the protections and benefits of marriage were unavailable to Thomp-
son and Kowalski. As discussed earlier, the benefits that are difficult or
impossible to obtain for lesbian and gay couples include employment
benefits, housing benefits, next-of-kin status in medical emergencies,
guardianship preference for disabled family members, preference in child
custody cases, rights of inheritance, and the right to make funeral ar-
rangements for family members.65
III. THE ROADS TO FAMILY STATUS
Lesbians and gay men have tried conventional and unconventional
avenues to overcome the presumption against their family status.
Among these approaches are constitutional challenges to marriage laws,
contracts, adult adoption, and state and local statutes. Each will be con-
sidered in turn and the effectiveness of each will be evaluated.
A. Family by Marriage: Constitutional Challenges to Marriage Laws
The most direct route to obtaining the benefits and protections of
marriage is to get married. Several gay and lesbian couples have tried to
do just that. In the 1970s, gay men 66 and lesbians attempted to challenge
marriage laws with constitutional claims. These claims were based on
the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) in states that adopted it as part of their state
constitutions.
63. See Louis Weisberg, Thompson Named Guardian, WINDY CrrY TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1991, at 1.
Thompson said the appellate court decision granting her custody was not a victory, but a just deci-
sion that should have been made years earlier. Because of the delay, Thompson said, Kowalski lost
things she will never regain because her parents put her in a nursing home instead of a rehabilitation
center. See also Lesbian Wins Guardianship of Injured Lover, CHI. TRIB., December 18, 1991, at 4.
After the decision, Thompson told reporters, "There aren't words to express the hell the system has
put us through."
64. See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
65. See Barbara Case, Repealable Rights: Municipal Civil Rights Protection for Lesbians and
Gays, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 441, 441-42 (1989).
66. All of the cases found on point involved gay male couples. There is no reason to believe the
results would be any different for lesbians challenging marriage laws on constitutional grounds.
1992]
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In Baker v. Nelson,67 a gay male couple filed for a writ of mandamus
to compel the county clerk of Hennepin County, Minnesota, to issue
them a marriage license. The trial court quashed the writ and the Min-
nesota appellate court affirmed.68 The men based their claim on legisla-
tive intent, and in the alternative, on the First, Eighth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 69 The appellate court dis-
missed the legislative intent argument, saying that common usage of the
term "marriage" refers to a union between persons of the opposite sex,
and the legislature presumably was using the term as it is commonly
understood. 70 The court rejected, without discussion, the First and
Eighth Amendment claims. 71
The men argued that they had a fundamental right to marry under
the Ninth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. 72 Further, they argued that they were being de-
prived of liberty and property without due process and were denied equal
protection of the laws. The court stated that inherent in these arguments
is the belief that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the par-
ties is a fundamental right.73 Citing Skinner v. Oklahoma 74 and Griswold
v. Connecticut,75 the court concluded that the right to marry is tied to
privacy in procreation and traditional family life. 76 Thus, there is no
fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex.
An attempt to use the state of Washington's Equal Rights Amend-
ment to argue that the state's refusal to issue a marriage license to two
men was sex discrimination was rejected in Singer v. Hara.77 Two men
argued that the marriage law was discriminatory in that it allowed a man
to marry a woman, but did not allow a man to marry a man.78 The
67. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 186.
70. Id. at 185-86.
71. Id. at 186 n.2.
72. Id. at 186.
73. Id.
74. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87. See also Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(C.D. Cal. 1980) ("the main justification ... [for] marriage is procreation, perpetuation of the
race."), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). The Adams opinion ends
with a remarkable statement from the court which foreshadows domestic partnership laws: "The
time may come, far in the future, when contracts and arrangements between persons of the same sex
who abide together will be recognized and enforced under state law.... But in my opinion, even
such a substantial change in the prevailing mores would not reach the point where such relationships
would be characterized as 'marriages'. . .. For that result to obtain, an affirmative enactment of
Congress will be required." Id. at 1125.
77. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
78. Id. at 1190.
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Washington appellate court rejected this argument, and agreed with the
government that as long as the law discriminated equally against male
pairs and female pairs, the ERA was not violated. The government's
argument was that the ERA would only be violated if the state allowed,
for example, gay men to marry, but did not allow lesbians to marry.79
The Singer court similarly rejected equal protection arguments in
which the men tried to draw an analogy between invalid racial classifica-
tions in marriage laws and invalid sex classifications. The court found
that the appellants were not being denied a marriage license because of a
classification based on sex, but rather because of the definition of mar-
riage as relationship entered into by persons of the opposite sex. 80 The
court also cited public policy reasons for not permitting the issuance of a
marriage license to the men.81
This rationale that the men could not marry because marriage is
defined as a relationship between persons of the opposite sex is circular.
In light of the rulings allowing interracial marriage, the court was incon-
sistent in its application of the ERA. The court ruled, as stated above,
that the ERA prohibited only disparate treatment of male couples and
female couples. In the racial context, this "logic" would mean that states
could prohibit whites from marrying whites, and Blacks from marrying
Blacks, as long as the state discriminated "equally" against white pairs
and Black pairs. In other words, a state could mandate interracial mar-
riage, prohibit intraracial marriage, and still comply with the Fourteenth
amendment. This was clearly not the message of the miscegenation
cases.
Also, defining marriage as a relationship between two persons of the
opposite sex is no more legitimate than defining marriage as a relation-
ship between two persons of the same race. The justification that mar-
riage exists for the purposes of procreation and therefore gays and
lesbians should be excluded cannot stand up under even a traditional
view of marriage. The ability to procreate is not a prerequisite for a mar-
riage license, and marriage is certainly not a prerequisite for procreation.
Many gays and lesbians have children, some from prior heterosexual re-
lationships, and some within a lesbian or gay relationship. Procreation
79. Id. at 1190-91.
80. Id. at 1192.
81. Id. at 1190 n.5 (citing examples of opposition to the ERA when it was initially on the
ballot). "Homosexual and lesbian marriage would be legalized, with further complication regarding
adoption of children into such a 'family.' People will live as they choose, but the beauty and sanctity
of marriage must be preserved from such needless desecration."
1992]
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appears to be a red herring, not an actual justification for denying same-
sex marriage.
Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson never challenged the Min-
nesota marriage statute.8 2 Had marriage been available to them, many of
their problems could have been resolved outright. Although there are
some cases where parents challenge a spouse for guardianship of a dis-
abled adult, the legal presumption is in favor of the spouse. In order to
take advantage of the benefits of marriage, Thompson and Kowalski
would have been required to publicly acknowledge their relationship.
This is a "catch-22" for many gays and lesbians: in order to receive socie-
tal benefits, they must publicly declare their relationship, but once they
publicly declare their relationship they are open to prosecution under
sodomy laws,8 3 and persecution from the homophobic society in which
they live.84 Marriage as a solution for gay and lesbian families presup-
poses the repeal of sodomy laws and general societal acceptance. By the
same token, marriage for gays and lesbians would probably lead to gen-
eral societal acceptance85 and the repeal of sodomy laws.8 6
82. Such a claim would have likely been rejected. The Baker case, discussed in notes 67-76 and
accompanying text, was decided by an appellate court of Minnesota, Thompson's and Kowalski's
home state. No such claim has ever been successful. Recently, the supreme court in Hawaii heard
arguments in a case brought by three same-sex couples seeking the right to marry in that state.
Apparently Hawaii's state constitution has provisions concerning privacy, due process and equal
protection that the couples argue give broader rights to gays and lesbians than does the U.S Consti-
tution. See Rex Wockner, Hawaii Supreme Court Hears Gay Marriage Case, OUTLINES, Nov. 1992,
at 13.
83. Minnesota is one of 24 states in which homosexual acts between consenting adults are still
illegal. The other states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See LEIGH W.
RUTLEDGE, THE GAY BOOK OF LiSmS 134 (1987) (list compiled as of 1987).
84. Hate crimes against gays and lesbians have increased an average of 42% in six major metro-
politan areas in the last year. A total of 1588 incidents of anti-gay violence were reported in Minne-
apolis/St. Paul, Boston, New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago. The incidents
included "physical assaults, acts of harassment, bomb threats, and instances of vandalism and ar-
son." See Chris Bull, Group's Survey Says Hate-Crime Reports Rose in Six Areas, THE ADVOCATE,
Apr. 9, 1991 at 14. The statistics were compiled by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. Hate
crimes are crimes committed against a minority group because of the characteristic that makes the
group a minority.
85. There is some dispute in the gay and lesbian community about whether marriage is too
much assimilation into "straight" life. Many gays and lesbians feel that heterosexual marriage is an
inherently oppressive model. This is one of the reasons domestic partnership laws have gained more
acceptance in the gay and lesbian community than marriage laws. Domestic partnership laws are
seen as creating something "other" than marriage, which has many negative connotations for gays
and lesbians.
86. See generally MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How AMERICA
WILL CONQUER ITS FEAR & HATRED OF GAYS IN THE 90'S (1990). The authors of this controver-
sial book suggest that gays have been too hasty in their rejection of "family" living situations because
of the oppression gays have suffered in traditional families. They suggest that if gays return to the
idea of "traditional gay families" as existed in ancient Greece, gays would be more acceptable to
mainstream America. The traditional gay family, in this view, is comprised of two same-sex partners
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B. Family by Agreement
One way to gain the benefits of family status is to create relation-
ships by contracts which mimic family rights and responsibilities as
closely as possible. The most useful documents for this purpose are co-
habitation contracts, durable powers of attorney, wills, and living wills.
1. Cohabitation Contracts
Cohabitation contracts first entered the public consciousness when
Michelle Triola Marvin sued Lee Marvin for "palimony" in 1970.87 Tri-
ola alleged that when she began living with Marvin in 1964, they made
an oral agreement to combine their efforts and earnings, sharing equally
any property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual
or combined. They further agreed to hold themselves out to the general
public as husband and wife, and that Triola would provide services to
Marvin as companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook.88 The trial
court dismissed Triola's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The appellate court affirmed, but the California
supreme court reversed and remanded for trial.8 9
The supreme court concluded that Triola had a claim for breach of
an express contract.90 Further, the court noted that such an agreement
relating to earnings, property, and expenses was not invalid merely be-
cause the parties contemplated engaging in a nonmarital relationship
when they entered into it.91 The court stated it would not enforce such
an agreement if based on sexual services as consideration, but added that
even if sexual services were part of the consideration, it would still en-
force any severable portion of the contract supported by independent
consideration. 92
In 1988, a California court of appeals extended this concept of co-
habitation contracts to homosexual relationships. Whorton v. Dilling-
with a significant age differential, where the older partner helps the younger partner not only finan-
cially, but "by shaping his character and increasing his wisdom." Id. at 370. The emphasis will then
be away from the sexual aspect of the relationship. This author thinks Kirk and Madsen are incredi-
bly naive to believe that mainstream America will find such relationships more palatable; if any-
thing, ageist attitudes combined with homophobic attitudes will make these relationships much less
palatable to mainstream America. This concept plays into the negative gay stereotype of older gay
men preying on very young men and children. Another problem with Kirk's and Madsen's idea is
that it is based strictly on a male model. There is no historical parallel for lesbians.
87. IRVING J. SLOAN, LIVING TOGETHER: UNMARRIEDS AND THE LAW 16 (1980).
88. Id. at 15-16.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 16.




ham 93 presents a fact situation that parallels Marvin v. Marvin in many
respects. Whorton and Dillingham, a gay male couple, began living to-
gether in 1977. They made an oral contract that Whorton, who was a
student, was to give up his studies and become Dillingham's "chauffeur,
bodyguard, social and business secretary, partner and counselor in real
estate investments" and was to "appear on his behalf when requested." '94
Further, Whorton was to work for Dillingham's business endeavors, and
be his "constant companion, confidant, travelling and social companion,
and lover." As consideration, Dillingham was to give Whorton a one-
half interest in real estate and property acquired together, to financially
support Whorton, and give him access to checking and savings accounts,
and to engage in a sexual relationship with Whorton. 95
Whorton performed his part of the contract until 1984 when Dil-
lingham terminated the relationship. Dillingham then refused to per-
form his part of the agreement by giving Whorton the half interest in real
estate and property.96 The court quoted Marvin v. Marvin extensively,
saying that such agreements are enforceable, unless expressly and in-
separably based on illicit consideration of sexual services. Still citing'
Marvin, the court stated that even if sexual services97 were part of the
consideration, any severable portion of the contract supported by in-
dependent consideration would be enforced. 98 Most importantly, the
court said Marvin is applicable to same-sex partners, and that there was
no legal basis to make a distinction between heterosexual and same-sex
couples. 99
The major barrier to the enforcement of cohabitation contracts is
the inclusion of sexual services as part of the consideration. 10° In
Whorton, the court distinguished the case Jones v. Daly,'0 where the
services provided as consideration in the contract between gay lovers
consisted of "lover, companion, homemaker, travelling companion,
housekeeper, and cook." 10 2 Because services as "lover" were included in
the agreement, the court found that sexual services and the services
93. 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988).
94. See id. at 406-07.
95. Id. at 407.
96. Id.
97. This is an important consideration for gay and lesbian couples. Because of the stereotype of
gay and lesbian relationships as being primarily sexual in nature, lesbians and gays must overcome
this presumption in courts which find sexual services to be non-severable and fatal to any contract.
See DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LESBLN WoMAN 5 (rev. ed. 1983)
98. 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
99. Id. at 408 n.l.
100. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw at 2-9, § 2.04 (Roberta Achtenberg, ed. 1989).
101. 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
102. Whorton 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (citing Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981)).
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which flowed from the sexual relationship were inseparable parts of the
consideration, and the agreement was thus unenforceable. 10
3
The Jones court seemed to believe that the sexual relationship was
the primary basis of the agreement. In part, this ruling is probably based
on a stereotype of gay and lesbian relationships as primarily, or even
solely, sexual in nature. 104 However, even in heterosexual cohabitation
agreements, courts will sometimes find the entire agreement invalid be-
cause of the inclusion of sexual services as part of the consideration. 105
Even when courts enforce cohabitation contracts, these agreements
are of limited utility to gay and lesbian couples attempting to enjoy the
benefits and protections of marriage. While they protect the couple
against each other,106 they extend no benefits in the public realm. For
example, cohabitation contracts are no aid in getting the employment
benefits of a gay or lesbian partner. Even if a couple contracts for child
custody, or guardianship preference, courts are free to disregard the
agreement entirely in order to make a "best interests" analysis.107 Fur-
ther, the cohabitation contract itself provides no protection for inheri-
tance, no power to act for a partner in a medical emergency, and no
ability to provide funeral arrangements for a deceased partner. At best, a
cohabitation contract can serve as proof that a serious relationship exists.
For Thompson and Kowalski, a cohabitation contract could have
provided proof of the nature of the relationship. 10 8 However, too much
"proof" of the nature of the relationship could have led the court to the
conclusion that the contract was void for including sexual services as
part of the consideration. In any case, a court battle would not have been
103. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (cited in Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr at 410).
104. For an example of this view of gays and lesbians, see ROGER J. MAGNUSON, ARE "GAY
RIGHTS" RIGHT? 13 (1985), where the author answers the question "Who are homosexuals?" with
the following explanation: " 'Homosexuals' or 'homophiles' seek orgastic satisfaction from simulated
sexual behavior with members of the same sex rather than from normal sexual behavior with mem-
bers of the opposite sex." While it is unclear what the author means by "simulated" versus "nor-
mal" sexual behavior, it is clear that his view of homosexuals is limited strictly to sexuality.
105. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (I1. 1979), where a woman who lived in a common
law marriage with a man for fifteen years was denied any property from the relationship. She had
made her claim under contract law and the court held that the contract was void because such an
agreement was based in part on sexual services as consideration. The court ruled that an agreement
based even in part on "illicit sexual services" was illegal.
106. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
107. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO L.J. 459, 542-
72 (1990).
108. Although, it is not clear why the judge seemed to want to find a sexual relationship before
he would legitimately recognize Thompson's interest in Kowalski's care and guardianship. The ap-
pellate court focused rather on Thompson's steady committment to Kowalski's care during the seven
years following the accident, ignoring as irrelevant claims that Thompson had entered into other
relationships during that time period. Kowalski III, supra note 6, at 796.
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avoided merely by the existence of such a document. Donald Kowalski
was not likely to view the relationship favorably merely because of the
existence of a document. A cohabitation contract probably carries little
weight in a guardianship hearing where the court is assessing the best
interests of the ward.1°9
2. Durable Powers of Attorney and Wills
For the benefits of family status in times of emergency, the most
useful documents are durable powers of attorney, living wills0, and
wills. " ' In some states, a statutory provision also allows a person to
express a preference for a long-term guardian." 2 A durable power of
attorney is a document where one person, the principal, authorizes an-
other person, the attorney in fact, to act on the principal's behalf if and
when the principal becomes incompetent."13 A durable power of attor-
ney differs from a regular power of attorney in that a regular power of
attorney allows the attorney to act on the principal's behalf up to the
time that the principal becomes incompetent. With a durable power of
attorney, the document generally becomes effective when the principal
becomes incompetent.
Such a document would have been instrumental in Karen Thomp-
son's dispute with Donald Kowalski because it would have shown
Sharon Kowalski's intent to have Karen Thompson act on her behalf." 4
One problem Thompson and Kowalski faced was that, in the appoint-
ment of a guardian, courts engage in a "best interests" analysis." 5
Courts attempt to determine which person to appoint as guardian in light
109. Consider, for example, the surrogacy contract in the case of "Baby M". See In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) The court in that case decided that a contract between the natural
parents agreeing on the custody of the child was not determinative, but rather only the best interests
of the child could be considered in determining custody. In the case of a guardianship proceeding
for an adult, a court is not bound to the ward's wishes expressed when still competent. The court is
free to act paternally and decide for an adult which guardian would be in that adult's best interest.
110. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-710 (1988). A living will act typically
allows a person to specify what medical procedures she or he would authorize if she or he became
disabled and unable to communicate. These statutes also allow a person to designate someone who
will transfer that person to the care of a physician who will comply with that person's wishes.
11. See Gina M. Torielli, Note, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of Medical Crisis,
12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220 (1989) for a complete analysis of each of these protections. Torielli
also discusses the case of Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson. Id. at 220-22.
112. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 802-1 to 802-11 (1988).
113. THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 6, App. B.
114. Id.
115. See generally Kowalski I and Kowalski II, supra note 6. In Kowalski III, supra note 6, at
792-93, the appellate court laid out the statutory considerations for the court to use in deciding the
best interests of the ward, including the ward's preference, the interaction between the proposed
guardian and the ward, and the interest and committment of the proposed guardian in the ward's
physical, social, educational, and rehabilitative needs.
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of the ward's best interest. Because Kowalski was evaluated as having
the cognitive abilities of a four- to six-year-old child16, the trial court
made its determination the same as it would in a child custody dis-
pute. 1 7 In child custody cases, courts almost never find that it is in a
child's best interests 18 to be placed with a gay or lesbian parent. 1 9
Sometimes a court will make its determination solely on the parent's sex-
uality.1 20  The trial court ruled for Donald Kowalski because, as
Sharon's father, he had "unconditional parental love" for his
daughter. 121
The trial court acknowledged that if Sharon Kowalski had reliably
expressed a desire to have Thompson as her guardian when she was still
competent, the court would be obliged to give weight to that prefer-
ence. 122 The appellate court pointed out that the trial court ignored am-
ple evidence that Kowalski had reliably expressed her wish to have
Thompson as her guardian. However, the primary consideration in
choosing a guardian is the ward's best interests, even if this somehow
conflicts with the ward's reliably expressed wishes. 2 3 Certainly a dura-
ble power of attorney executed by Kowalski when she was still compe-
tent would have served as proof of Kowalski's wish to have Thompson as
116. A fact Thompson vehemently disputes from her own extensive experience with Kowalski's
abilities.
117. Clearly, if Kowalski and Thompson had been married the court would not have followed
this same analysis, with a presumption in favor of a parent over a partner. Donald Kowalski argued
vigorously that he felt his daughter would be sexually abused by Kowalski, an assumption for which
he had no proof beyond his own prejudices. If Thompson had been, Kowalski's spouse, the court
would not have given credence to any such argument.
118. But see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), where a unanimous Court rejected the best
interests analysis when custody of the child was taken away from a mother because she married a
man of another race. The Court rejected the lower court's justification that the child should be
removed from an interracial home because the child would be subject to social stigmatization. The
Court stated with no uncertainty that while the Court could not control biases, it would not tolerate
them. "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect." Id. at 433. Applying this reasoning to gay and lesbian guardianship disputes, the
courts should not enforce private biases against gays by giving them legal effect.
119. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985), where the court said placement of the
child with a gay parent "flies in the face of society's mores" and that it could not condone exposing
minor children to an illicit relationship. See also McGinnis v. McGinnis, 567 So. 2d (Ala. Civ. App.
1990), where custody was denied to a lesbian mother who had unsuccessfully attempted to conceal
the relationship from her children.
120. See'Haugland, Illinois Appeals Court to Rule on Lesbian Mom Custody Battle, OUTLINES,
Apr. 1991, at 22. The trial court's decision to deny custody to the mother was based solely on her
sexual orientation. The judge also restricted the mother's visitation, saying the mother could not
visit with her daughter in the presence of any woman with whom the mother is living.
121. See Kowalski I, supra note 6, at 865.
122. Id.
123. Thompson maintains that Kowalski has repeatedly expressed her wish to live with Thomp-
son. See THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra, note 6. The appellate court acknowledged that the




her guardian, but it would not have bound the court to appoint
Thompson.
Wills also can be a problematic area for gays and lesbians. If a gay
man or lesbian dies intestate, the partner will not have an automatic
claim to the estate 24 as would a spouse. 1 25 Having a will might not help
the situation at all. One commentator has concluded that "a homosexual
testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in greater
risk of having his testamentary plans overturned than does a heterosex-
ual testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to a spouse or lover."' 26
The author attributes this phenomenon to homophobia' 27 in the courts
and in the families of the testators.
The grounds for challenging a will, in general, are improper execu-
tion, mental incompetence of the testator, undue influence, and fraud. 128
When the testator and beneficiary were involved in a gay relationship,
the most likely challenge is on the grounds of undue influence. ' 29 Undue
influence consists of physical coercion or threats of physical harm or du-
ress so powerful as to overcome the will of the testator and substitute the
will of another. ' 30 There is no evidence that undue influence occurs with
greater frequency in the gay population than in the non-gay popula-
tion. '3' Rather, this seems to be another example of homophobia at
work in the courts. 32
There are steps a lesbian or gay partner can take to protect against
such challenges to a will. One measure of protection is to periodically
draft a new will without destroying prior versions. '33 This will discour-
age a challenge because a successful challenge to the last will merely
means the previous will is in effect.
Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson owned property together.
They lived in a house which was purchased in Thompson's name for
financial reasons. ' 34 If Kowalski had been killed in the accident, her par-
ents would have been free to take her personal property from Thomp-
124. The most notorious example of this is when Gertrude Stein died and left Alice B. Toklas,
her life-companion penniless. At the time Stein was extremely wealthy because of her associations
with various artists who gave their works to her.
125. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
126. Sherman, supra note 36, at 267.
127. Homophobia is an irrational fear and hatred of homosexuality and of gay men and lesbians.
See Sherman, supra note 36, at 225 n.2.
128. See ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 88.
129. Id.; see also Sherman, supra note 36.
130. See ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 88.
131. See Sherman, supra note 36.
132. See ACLU HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 88, and accompanying footnotes.
133. Id. at 89.
134. See THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 6, at 9.
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son's home. If Thompson had died, Kowalski could have been left
entirely without a claim for the house, even though she contributed to
the purchase and payments. A will would have been effective in keeping
the personal and real property in the hands of the surviving partner.
Any undue influence challenge to the will probably would have been
based on the nine-year age difference between the women and the fact
that Kowalski had once been a student in Thompson's class at the uni-
versity where Thompson teaches.' 35
C. Family by Adult Adoption
Adult adoption is a drastic and often irreversible step toward solving
the problem of family status for gay and lesbian couples. As the term
implies, "[a]dult adoption is the adoption of an adult by another
adult." 136 The relationship created by adult adoption is that of parent
and child, with the exception that the "parent" has no legal duty to sup-
port the "child". 137
One effect of adult adoption is that the legal relationship between
the "child" and his or her natural parents is severed. For this reason,
gays and lesbians can use adult adoption to nullify the status of blood
relatives so that they will not have standing to challenge a will. 138 Adult
adoption also can help with other situations in which next-of-kin status is
critical. As discussed above, such status is needed when making medical
decisions for an incapacitated partner, gaining access to the partner and
the partner's records in the hospital, and making funeral arrangements.
Further, parent-child status fits within the bounds of family for zoning
ordinances and rent control laws. 139
At first glance, adult adoption seems to be the solution to most fam-
ily status problems. 14 However, there are major hurdles to overcome in
using adult adoption. First, some jurisdictions disapprove of adult adop-
tions involving gays and lesbians as being against public policy and con-
trary to legislative intent, and refuse to grant them.' 4' Another problem
is that with very few exceptions, adult adoptions are not revocable. 142
Thus, "[t]he adoptee will continue to be the adoptor's legal heir forever,
unless by chance or design the adoptee is subsequently adopted by some-
135. See id. at 12.
136. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 100, at 1-81.
137. Id. at 1-83.
138. Id. at 1-85 thru 1-86.
139. Id. at 1-87 thru 1-88.
140. It still does not help in gaining employment benefits available to spouses and dependents.
141. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 100, at 1-82 n.168.2.
142. Id. at 1-91 thru 1-92.
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one else.' '1 43
If Thompson and Kowalski had successfully overcome the barriers
to adult adoption, such a relationship would have been very useful in a
time of medical emergency, and for the purposes of guardianship. If
Thompson had adopted Kowalski, Kowalski's relationship with her par-
ents would have been legally severed and the court would have had to
give Thompson the same deference granted to Kowalski's natural parent.
However, if Kowalski had adopted Thompson, then Kowalski's relation-
ship with her parents would still be in tact, and the court battle would
have been between the natural parents and the adopted "child".
The outcome of a case like this is difficult to predict. It is not hard
to imagine that public policy would be invoked against the adopted per-
son if the true nature of the relationship was before the court. For this
reason, gay men and lesbians using adult adoption to create the family
relationship should probably determine which partner's natural family
would be more resistant to the relationship, and have that person be the
adoptee. The unpredictability of this path of action limits its usefulness.
D. Family by Judicial Fiat
On a few occasions, courts have resolved disputes between gay part-
ners in a way that parallels the resolution of disputes between married
couples. Two cases of particular interest involve property disputes, in
one case between two gay male partners, and in the other case between a
gay man and his deceased partner's family. In Bramlett v. Selman,'" a
gay man who was in the process of divorcing his wife, turned over $7,000
to his male partner to hide the assets from his wife. The partner used the
funds to purchase a house in his own name, as the partners had agreed.
When the two men separated shortly thereafter, the purchaser refused to
turn over any rights to the house, saying the $7,000 had been a gift.145
The Arkansas chancery court held otherwise, ruling that the pur-
chaser held title to the property as a constructive trustee for his part-
ner.146 The court ordered the "trustee" to convey title to his partner,
and ordered the partner to reimburse the trustee for his expenses. 47
The supreme court of Arkansas affirmed the decision, saying that a
"confidential relationship" had existed between the parties, and that they
143. Id. at 1-9 1. While it may be possible to nullify the inheritance effect of the adoption with a
will, other aspects of the family status remain in effect. For example, this person is still next-of-kin.
144. 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980).
145. Id. at 81-82.




had a fiduciary responsibility to each other. 148 The court reasoned that
such a relationship exists when one person has gained the confidence of
another and purports to act with the other's interest in mind.' 49 The
court said that not all homosexual relationships create a fiduciary rela-
tionship, but there was such a relationship in this case. The court based
its finding on the fact that the two had been lovers for a year and had
lived together for most of that year.150 In an unusual decision, the court
concluded that "[a]ll homosexual involvements are not as a matter of law
confidential relationships sufficient to support a constructive trust, but a
court of equity should not deny relief to a person merely because he is a
homosexual."151
The court protected one gay partner against another in Bramlett.
The other case, Weekes v. Gay,152 involved a dispute between a gay man
and his deceased partner's family over two pieces of property the men
owned together. The dead man's heirs claimed a half-interest in one of
the properties, which the two owned as co-tenants, and a full interest in
another property which was in the decedent's name only. 153 A Georgia
trial court found that the surviving partner had supported the decedent
and had supplied most of the purchase price for both properties.154 Fur-
ther, the trial court found that the men had lived together for six years in
a homosexual relationship. 155 The trial court agreed with the surviving
partner that he had an interest in the property as the result of an implied
trust that arose from his having furnished the funds for purchase. 156
The appellate court affirmed, saying that equity prevented the blood
heirs from a windfall recovery when the beneficial interest should flow to
the partner. 157 Further, the court rejected the family's argument that the
surviving partner should be denied relief because of the nature of the
relationship. However, the court reached this conclusion by saying that
the evidence was inconclusive as to the exact nature of the relationship,
even though the trial court made a finding that the two were in a homo-
sexual relationship.1 58
148. Id. at 84.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 85.
152. Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 1979).
153. Id. at 902.
154. Id. at 903.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 904.
157. Id.
158. Id. It is unclear why the appellate court did this. One explanation is that they did not want
to set a precedent advantageous to gays and lesbians, that would be deemed against public policy.
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These cases indicate that at least some courts are willing to use con-
cepts of equity to overcome presumptions against gay and lesbian part-
ners. However, these decisions are rare, and courts will more often point
to public policy to deny relief to lesbian and gay litigants. 159 Property
rights cases seem to be the exception to the rule.
Judicial remedies are an uncertain method of protecting the non-
traditional family, as Karen Thompson and Sharon Kowalski discovered.
Thompson spent seven years in court fighting for her right to care for her
disabled lover. In the end, an appellate court found that the trail court
abused its discretion in denying Thompson's petition for guardianship.
Abuse of discretion is normally a very difficult standard to overcome. It
is questionable whether Thompson would have ever gained guardianship
of Kowalski had Donald Kowalski not voluntarily relinquished his exer-
cise of "unconditional parental love." Equitable remedies are inadequate
protections for gay and lesbian families. First, it is preferable to prevent
a dispute from getting to this point. Second, courts point to public policy
when rendering decisions, and public policy is almost always adverse to
the interests of gay men and lesbians. Finally, for Thompson and Ko-
walski, the main issue was not the protection of property rights but
rather guardianship rights, and courts are reluctant to extend equity into
this arena.
III. FAMILY BY LAW: MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
AND OTHER LOCAL LAWS
A large number of cities' 60 and one state16' have laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The ordinances typi-
cally cover housing and public employment. Some cities extend coverage
to education and private employment as well. 162 While these ordinances
provide protection from discrimination, they do not give gays and lesbi-
ans affirmative rights, or status as family.
A. Protections Offered by Domestic Partnership Laws
Recently, six cities 63 passed "domestic partnership" ordinances,
159. See Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-sex Relationships An Equal Protection Analy-
sis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 621 n.20 (1989).
160. Barbara Case, Repealable Rights: Municipal Civil Rights Protection for Lesbians and Gays, 7
LAW & INEQ. J. 441, 445 n.25 (1989), noting that in 1989, 61 cities had ordinances prohibiting
discrimination based on real or perceived sexual orientation.
161. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-111.32 (West 1988).
162. Case, supra note 160, at 450.
163. The cities that have passed domestic partnership laws are Berkeley, California; Ithaca, New
York; Madison, Wisconsin; Minneapolis, Minnesota; San Francisco, California; and West
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which give affirmative rights and statuses to gay and lesbian couples.
The benefits and responsibilities under the ordinances are varied. In
West Hollywood, California, the benefits include medical insurance for
partners of city employees, hospital and jail visitation rights, and protec-
tion from housing discrimination. 164 Berkeley, California grants major
medical, dental and leave benefits to the partners of city employees. 165
The city of Ithaca, New York, has an ordinance with symbolic meaning
only. Partners file an Affidavit of Domestic Partnership with the city
stating that they are unmarried, share a residence, and have a relation-
ship of mutual support and commitment. However, there are no mate-
rial benefits attached to the partnership. 166
Medical, dental, and vision benefits, as well as sick and bereavement
leave are provided for the domestic partners of Santa Cruz, California
employees.1 67 The approach in Takoma Park, Maryland was to include
domestic partners in the definition of "immediate family" in the city
code. The result is that housing and employment benefits extended to
traditional families are now extended to domestic partners. 168 In Los
Angeles, sick and bereavement leave are available to the domestic part-
ners of city employees. 169 The use of sick leave to take care of a domes-
tic partner and funeral leave to attend the funeral of a domestic partner
are approved in Seattle, Washington, the largest city to date to recognize
domestic partnerships.1 70
The Madison, Wisconsin ordinance 171 gives broader rights and priv-
ileges than most domestic partnership ordinances. 172 The Madison Ordi-
nance was passed in June 1990. The law allows any two adults,
regardless of gender, and their dependents to register with the city clerk
as a domestic partnership for a fee of $25, as long as they satisfy certain
requirements. 173 Thus, the partnership can consist of two adults, or two
Hollywood, California. Ann Arbor, Michigan; Cambridge, Massachusettes; East Lansing, Michi-
gan; Laguna Beach, California; Los Angeles, California; New York City, New York; Santa Cruz,
California; Seattle, Washington; Shorewood Hills, Wisconsin; Takoma Park, Maryland; Washington
D.C.; and West Palm Beach, Florida all give some benefits to nontraditional families, but do not
provide for a registry of relationships. See Ann Belser, Rights; Privileges and Gay Lovers, THE
ADVOCATE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 57.




168. Id. at 6.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. MADISON Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES, §§ 3.23(2), 3.23(5)(a)(b), 3.23(10) (1990).
172. ACLU Briefing Series, supra note 7, at 6. The briefing packet summarizes the main benefits
made available in each city with domestic partnership legislation.
173. MADISON Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES, § 3.23(10) (1990).
1992]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
adults and their children or other dependents.
The couple is required to be "in a relationship of mutual support,
caring and commitment" and must "intend to remain in such a relation-
ship in the immediate future."'' 74 They cannot be married (except to
each other) or legally separated. Further, they must wait six months af-
ter any annulment or divorce preceding in which either was a party
before applying for a domestic partnership. 175
Neither domestic partner can currently be registered in a domestic
partnership with a different domestic partner. As in the case of prior
divorces and annulments, the parties must wait six months after the dis-
solution of a domestic partnership before filing for a new one.' 76 Both
partners must be eighteen years of age or older 177 and must be competent
to contract. 78 The partners must occupy the same dwelling unit as a
single, nonprofit household. 79  Finally, the relationship between the
partners must be "of permanent and distinct domestic character."' 180
The relationship cannot be "merely temporary, social, political, commer-
cial or economic in nature."''
The American Civil Liberties Union recommends that domestic
partnerships should be available to "any two people who have expressed
a mutual obligation of support for their common welfare."1 82 The benefit
of this approach is that the partnership is based not on sexual orientation
or sexual involvement, but rather on the level of commitment between
the partners. 83 As minimum requirements for entering into a partner-
ship, the ACLU recommends that the partners be required to swear in an
affidavit that they live together and have done so for some period of time,
that they are not married, that they are eighteen years or older, that they
174. MADISON Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES, § 3.23(2)(aa)(1) (1990). Thus, Madison has no
explicit requirement that this be a sexual relationship. But see infra note 181.
175. MADISON Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES, § 3.23(2)(aa)(2).
176. Id., at § 3.23(2)(aa)(3).
177. Id. at § 3.23(2)(aa)(4).
178. Id. at § 3.23(2)(aa)(5).
179. Id. at § 3.23(2)(aa)(6).
180. Id.
181. MADISON Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES, §§ 3.23(2)(aa)(7) and 3.23(10). It is difficult to
imagine what has been left off of this list except "sexual." Thus, while the Madison ordinance does
not specifically require that the parties be involved in a sexual relationship, platonic friendship is
presumably not an adequate basis for forming a domestic partnership. It is unclear why the initial
requirement that the parties be engaged in a relationship of mutual support, caring, and committ-
ment was not a sufficient definition. Presumably, the city is trying to prevent fraud; that is, it is
trying to prevent persons who are not in a more permanant family relationship from taking advan-
tage of these benefits on a short term basis. This leads into another debate about why our society
discriminates against single people, but that debate is beyond the scope of this paper.




are not related by blood closer than would be allowed for marriage in
that state, and that they are mentally competent to contract. 184
Further, the ACLU recommends that the partners should be re-
quired to swear that they are each other's sole domestic partner and are
responsible for their common, welfare. Partners should be required to
notify the appropriate authority if any of the relevant circumstances of
the relationship change. The ACLU recommends that all of this be af-
firmed under penalty of perjury. 18 5 Presumably, these recommendations
are meant to prevent abuse of the system of domestic partnerships. 186
The Madison ordinance defines domestic partner as "those adults in
a domestic partnership." 187 The "mutual support" required means that
"the domestic partners contribute mutually to the maintenance and sup-
port of the domestic partnership throughout its existence."' 188
Domestic partners in Madison must agree to notify the city clerk of
any change in the status of their domestic partner relationship. After
verifying the application, the clerk issues a registration certificate. The
partnership is terminated 30 days after one or both partners file a written
notice of the termination. 189
The Madison ordinance protects persons in a domestic partnership
in several ways. First, the ordinance provides that it is unlawful for any-
one to deny someone access to or charge a higher price for any public
accommodation or place of amusement on the basis of his or her domes-
tic partnership status.190 Second, organizations which operate public ac-
commodations and which sell memberships based on family status are
required to provide the same benefits to domestic partnerships as are pro-
vided to other families. 191 Third, the ordinance prohibits the publication,
display, circulation or mailing of any written communication which is to
the effect that any of the facilities of any public place of accommodation
or amusement will be denied to any person by reason of her or his do-
mestic partnership status or that the patronage of a person is unwelcome,
objectionable or unacceptable on the basis of that person's domestic part-
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 4.
187. MADISON Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES, § 3.23(2)(bb). A dependent, for the purposes of
this law, is a biological child of a domestic partner, or a dependent as defined in IRS regulations, or a
ward of a domestic partner as determined in a guardianship proceeding, or a person adopted by a
domestic partner. Id. at § 3.23(2)(cc).
188. Id. at § 3.23(2)(dd).
189. Id. at § 3.23(10).





The ordinance is tied to Madison's human rights law, which prohib-
its discrimination based on many factors, including sexual orientation, in
the areas of housing,193 employment, public accommodations, and city
facilities.' 94 The ordinance provides for.enforcement of the provisions
through an "Equal Opportunity Commission."' 195 The Commission is
empowered to receive complaints and attempt to remedy any violation
"by means of conciliation, persuasion, education, litigation, or any other
means."' 196 The Commission can request the city attorney to intervene
and seek enforcement of the ordinance in appropriate courts.
Other cities have similar requirements for persons wishing to regis-
ter as domestic partners. For example, in Laguna Beach, California,
partners are required to sign an affidavit stating that they have lived to-
gether for at least six months, plan to live together indefinitely, are not
related by blood, are mentally competent, and will notify the city if the
relationship dissolves.' 97
One typical use of domestic partnership laws is to extend health and
other employment benefits to the domestic partners of city workers.' 98
Extended employment benefits include unpaid leave to take care of ill
family members, 99 and funeral leave on the death of a domestic part-
ner.20° In many cities, opposition to these measures takes the form of
complaints about potential costs. Many people apparently assume that
lesbians 201 and gay men will be the main users of the law and that be-
cause of AIDS, costs will be high.20 2 However, in at least one city, the
employee pays the costs of his or her dependent's premiums, and in an-
other, which was forced to self-insure because of fear of AIDS costs, the
192. Id. at § 3.23(5)(b).
193. Id. at § 3.23(4). This includes the obtaining of credit to purchase housing.
194. Id. at § 3.23(1).
195. Id. at § 3.23(9).
196. Id.
197. See Carla Rivera, Partners of Gays To Receive City Medical Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1990, Part B, at 1. See also, California, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 1990, News section.
198. The California cities of Laguna Beach, Berekley, and West Hollywood all extend health
insurance benefits to domestic partners of city employees. See Ann Belser, Rights. Privileges, and
Gay Lovers, THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 57.
199. See Michael Abramowitz, D.C Council Panel Backs Limiting Officeholders' Terms, WASH.
PoST, Oct. 12, 1990, § 1, at Al.
200. See Few In Signup Are Homosexual, SEATrLE TiMES, Apr. 28, 1990, Northwest Section, at
A14.
201. Lesbians comprise one of the lowest risk groups for AIDS and they account for half of the
gay couples who would presumably use domestic partnership laws to gain insurance benefits. See
ACL U Briefing Series, supra note 7, at 4.
202. See Isaacson, supra note 20, at 102.
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cost of insurance for the city went down. 20 3 Further, most of the couples
who register for domestic partnerships are heterosexual.204 Insurance
companies would actually benefit from increased premiums, paid either
by the employee or the employer, and insurance companies that have
provided domestic partnership coverage report no increased costs. 20 5
Domestic partnership ordinances do not currently create legally en-
forceable obligations between the partners. However, such obligations
are completely consistent with the rationale for creating domestic part-
nerships. State law would be controlling in this area, and no state has
enacted a domestic partnership law.20 6 Once enacted, case law involving
marital obligations could be extended to domestic partnerships.
The utility of domestic partnership ordinances is not limited to their
terms. In court proceedings such as Sharon Kowalski's guardianship
hearings, a certificate of domestic partnership would have provided to
the court proof of the relationship.207 The court would also have to ac-
cept the clear legislative intent in favor of such arrangements when mak-
ing its decision. In jurisdictions that have no such laws, or in
jurisdictions where the laws indicate legislative intent against same-sex
relationships, 20 8 partners have to overcome "public policy" arguments
when trying to enforce the terms of their relationships. The battle for
guardianship takes place in state court, however, and the ordinance evi-
dences the intent of city lawmakers only. This is one of the problems
with passing domestic partnership laws on a city-wide basis.
B. Limitations of Domestic Partnership Ordinances
One problem with domestic partnership ordinances is that they are
subject to repeal efforts. Many cities with human rights ordinances
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation have been targeted
by religious and other "pro-family" groups trying to repeal the laws.2 9
203. Id. Isaacson cites the case of the city of West Hollywood, which was forced to self-insure,
actually resulting in a drop in costs.
204. See Few in Signup Are Homosexual, supra note 200, at A14, stating that only 28% of Seattle
city employees who applied for health insurance for a domestic partner are gay or lesbian.
205. See ACLU Briefing Series, supra note 7, at 4.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id. The ACLU contends that the ordinances will help legitimize gay relationships. Instead
of being seen as transitory or unstable, gay relationships will gain legal recognition. Also, the ordi-
nances could be helpful in the growing number of custody disputes in gay and lesbian families.
208. Twenty-five states have sodomy laws which criminalize certain sexual behaviors generally
associated with the gay and lesbian community. See Philip S. Gutis, Small Steps Toward Acceptance
Renew Debate on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1989, § 4, at 24. Courts sometimes use these
laws to conclude that public policy and legislative intent is against same-sex relationships. The first
step toward domestic partnership in these states would be repeal of the sodomy laws.
209. Case, supra note 65, at 451-53.
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Similar attacks have been mounted on the few domestic partnership laws
in effect. 210 Another problem is that the laws are difficult to pass in the
first place, often facing opposition from influential religious leaders. 21'
Further, passing and then defending such laws city by city is an arduous,
costly task.212
A legislative solution, however, still has benefits over a judicially
imposed one. Judicial decisions can be overturned just as easily as laws.
Further, judges are not typically subject to the same political pressures as
legislators, and gays will have little to no control over the result of the
judicial process. Because lawmakers can sometimes legislate around ju-
dicial decisions, advances made in the courts can be undone in the legis-
latures. For these reasons, it might be preferable to gain support in the
legislature. 213
Some of the most serious limitations on the effectiveness of domestic
partnership and other municipal ordinances are constitutional and con-
gressional limits. If a municipal ordinance conflicts with a state or the
federal constitution, the constitutional provision will, by virtue of the
supremacy clause, take precedence. When municipal ordinances are per-
ceived by courts to violate the congressional intent of a federal law, fed-
eral law will preempt the ordinance.
The Human Rights Act of Washington D.C. came into direct con-
210. See Robert T. Nelson, Live-in Partner Policy Likely Headed To Ballot, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1990, at Al, stating that a group called "Citizens for Family" collected signatures to put a
repeal on the ballot. The reasons given for opposing the domestic partnership law were "financial,
social, and moral." See also Robert T. Nelson, Initiative 35 Opponents Bracing For Tough Fight,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 7, 1990, at B6. Initiative 35 is the measure "Citizens for Family" managed to
place on the ballot for November 6, 1990 elections.
211. Isaacson, supra note 20. The author states that voters rejected domestic partnership legisla-
tion in San Francisco after "vocal opposition from the city's archbishop and other religious leaders."
See also U.S. Bishops Urged To Fight Gay Measure, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1992, at 3. The Vatican
directed U.S. Cathlolic leaders to oppose any gay rights legislation that would make it illegal to
discriminate against gay men and lesbian women in adoption proceedings, or in hiring for certain
jobs. The Vatican stated that homosexualtiy was an "objective disorder" and that discriminating
against homosexuals was necessary to protect the common good. The Vatican told the bishops that
discrimination against gays was not only allowable, but is sometimes "obligatory." In Chicago, the
passage of a human rights ordinance was delayed because of opposition from local Catholic leaders.
212. See Case, supra note 65, at 452. Reactionary groups in at least three cities and four states
have attempted ballot measures which would prevent city councils and legislatures from enacting
laws to protect gays and lesbians. These unusual attempts to thwart the democratic process gener-
ally denounce homosexuality, and seek to forbid any government action that will "promote or legiti-
mize" homosexuality. See Mary Newcombe, LAMBDA Fights Against Homophobic Ballot
Initiatives, LAMBDA UPDATE, (LAMBDA Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, N.Y.), Spring 1992, at 25.
The legal defense and education group states that these ballot initiatives are draining resources of the
gay community and fanning homophobia.
213. A full analysis of whether the answer for gay and lesbian families lies with the courts or
with the legislature is beyond the scope of this Note. Because it is a significant issue, I have included
some discussion on it. Ultimately, a legislative solution with popular support is probably preferable
because it would result in more widespread and permanent changes.
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flict with the free exercise clause of the first amendment in Gay Rights
Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown Univer-
Sity. 21 4 The Human Rights Act prohibited discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation, among other factors. The Act also forbade practices
having a disparate impact on protected groups, including gays and lesbi-
ans. Under the provisions of this Act, a gay and lesbian student group
sought to compel the Catholic university to grant it official university
recognition. 215
The university resisted on constitutional grounds arguing that rec-
ognition would be tantamount to endorsement of the group, and the uni-
versity should not be compelled, under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment, to endorse a homosexual group against Catholic teach-
ings.216 The court of appeals agreed that the university could not be
forced to recognize the group, but held that the university could be com-
pelled to provide the same services and facilities to the group as it did for
other student groups.217
The court drew a distinction between endorsement, which could in-
fringe on the university's free exercise of religion, and the provision of
tangible benefits. The court found that providing services to the group
constituted a slight burden on the university's free exercise of religion,
but the District of Columbia's compelling interest in eradicating discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation overrode that burden.218
Similarly, United States v. City of Philadelphia 219 demonstrated the
limit that federal law imposes on municipal ordinances. Two law stu-
dents at Temple University sued the university for allowing the Judge
Advocate General (J.A.G.) Corps of the Army to use the university's
placement office for recruitment. The suit alleged that the University
was aware that the J.A.G. Corps discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation, in violation of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance. 220
As a result of the students' complaint, the Philadelphia Commission on
Human Relations ordered the university to stop cooperating with the
J.A.G. Corps. 221
At that point, the United States intervened and filed, together with
the university, a complaint claiming that the Commission's order vio-
214. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
215. Id. at 4-5.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 39.
218. Id. at 38-39.
219. 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).




lated the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court
agreed, saying the Commission was attempting to regulate the conduct of
the United States. The appellate court affirmed, saying that Congress
had expressed clear intent that the military have full access to college
campuses for the purpose of recruiting. In light of Congressional intent,
the city could not prohibit the J.A.G. Corps from recruiting on campus.
The court acknowledged that the city had an important interest at stake
in eradicating employment discrimination, but federal law preempted the
ordinance nonetheless. 222
In terms of benefits for domestic partners, preemption problems
would probably arise mostly in relation to religious organizations and the
military. Neither could presumably be required to provide the same ben-
efits to domestic partners as to married partners. Neither religious orga-
nizations nor the military could be prohibited from discriminating
against a person on the basis of their sexual orientation or their status as
a domestic partner. To the degree that the military and religious organi-
zations are employers, educators, and housing suppliers they can have
some preemptive effect on domestic partnership laws.
A new, but predictable, 223 objection to domestic partnership laws is
that these laws provide "special rights" for homosexuals. Conservative
politicians seize on these ordinances as an example of the breakdown of
the family. 224 Domestic partnership laws are especially vulnerable to
such attack because they may appear to give the benefits of marriage
without requiring the accompanying obligations. Although this interpre-
tation is incorrect, these laws rarely get a full hearing in the mainstream
press. However, any attempt by gay men and lesbian women to obtain
basic civil rights is open to this kind of attack as long as homophobia
222. Id. at 84-85.
223. Such an attack is predictable because it has followed every civil rights movement this coun-
try has seen. A recent example is the women's movement, where some conservatives attempted to
portray the movement as seeking superior rights for women, not just equal rights. The goal of the
tactic is to portray the motives of the movement as less than honorable, and to make those in the
majority feel the movement will take something away from them.
224. See Ann Devroy, Bush Says He Opposes Gay Rights Legislation, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Apr. 22,
1992, at 26. George Bush told a group of evangelical christian leaders that he opposes "special laws
to protect homosexuals" including domestic partnership ordinances. Bush requested this meeting
because the religious leaders were upset that Bush's campaign chair, Robert Mosbacher, had met
with leaders of gay and lesbian groups. Mosbacher's adult daughter is an open lesbian, and had
arranged the initial meeting. Bush was asked by the religious group to reiterate his support for
"traditional values," and to state his opposition to the the so-called "homosexual agenda." In this
election year, Bush gladly obliged. See also Perot Rules Out Homosexuals For Certain Cabinet Posi-
tions, CH. TRIB., May 28, 1992, at 15. While Ross Perot was still in the running for the presidency
in 1992, he stated that having homosexuals in Cabinet positions would distract the public from the
tasks at hand, and that allowing homosexuals in the military was unrealistic.
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prevails.225 Conservatives are not likely to view a change to marriage
laws to include same-sex marriage any more favorably than domestic
partnership laws. Thus, even though domestic partnership laws have
proved very vulnerable to this kind of attack, any civil rights effort will
be subject to some level of criticism on these grounds.
Finally, while domestic partnership laws remain untested in the
courts, nondiscrimination laws have been somewhat ineffective due to
constitutional challenges and preemption by federal law, as described
above. There is no reason to expect that domestic partnership laws will
not be met with the same challenges. Domestic partnership laws on a
municipal level are, overall, an expensive and ineffective solution to the
larger problem. 226
Domestic partnership laws should be passed on a state-wide level to
be cost-effective. Also, in addition to employment benefits such as insur-
ance and bereavement leave, domestic partnership laws should provide to
lesbian and gay couples more of the benefits and protections available
through marriage. Because these laws have met with a considerable
amount of resistance, 227 they might be most useful as a bridge to public
acceptance of the full legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships through
marriage.
The best solution is the inclusion of gays and lesbians in the mar-
riage laws. Gays and lesbians would then have, all at once, the same
protections their heterosexual counterparts enjoy. Although these efforts
have not yet been successful in any state, a concentrated effort in one
liberal state could achieve the desired effect for the entire country. If gay
and lesbian marriage is legitimized in any state, other states would be
forced to recognize gay marriages conducted in that state through the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. It is not difficult to imag-
ine that a domino effect would be created, as gays and lesbians through-
225. See Military Discharges National Guard Colonel for Being A Lesbian, CHI. TRIn., May 29,
1992, at 8. Colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer had served in the military for 26 years, was a deco-
rated Vietnam veteran, and held a doctorate in nursing. Although the Washington National Guard
opposed her discharge, the National Guard felt obliged to discharge her because of the Defense
Department policy that states that homosexuality is incompatible with military service and causes
morale problems. The military is a microcosm of the homophobia present in American society at
large.
226. See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text.
227. According to a TIME/CNN survey conducted by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 54% of
Americans agreed that homosexual couples should be allowed to receive medical insurance and life
insurance benefits from their partner's insurance policies. However, 69% disapproved of making
"gay marriage" legal, and 75% disapproved of gay couples adopting children. So while the country
is getting more tolerant of gay and lesbian relationships in some respects, the majority still disap-
proves of full legitimacy for gay and lesbian relationships. See Isaacson, supra note 20.
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out the country flocked to the state that would marry them, and then
returned to their home state, which would be forced to honor the union.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lesbian women and gay men attempting to gain the benefits and
protections of family status have few avenues available to that end. Cur-
rently, a combination of contractual and statutory provisions come clos-
est to granting the same protections heterosexuals can obtain through
marriage. Domestic partnership laws are a step in the right direction. In
addition to the direct benefits of these laws, they can provide indirect
benefits as well. A certificate of domestic partnership can provide proof
to a court of the nature of a relationship for gay and lesbian couples.
Domestic partnership laws can be a bridge to greater inclusion in the law
for gay men and lesbian women.
Also, having such a law on the books evidences public policy in
favor of such living arrangements. Overall, though, domestic partner-
ship laws provide only a beginning to the solution of the problems for
nontraditional families. Only inclusion in the marriage laws themselves
will result in the same protections for gays and lesbians as their hetero-
sexual counterparts.
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